![]() ![]() ![]() Access to training and education models so that NSIRA staff can build knowledge about the programs they are reviewing.Office space in reviewed agencies’ offices.Proxy Access so that NSIRA can access information in the presence of reviewed agency’s staff, with that agency’s staff reviewing information ahead of it being disclosed to NSIRA’s reviewers.Targeted Access so that NSIRA has direct access to a reviewed agency’s networks or sensitive information.Tailored access includes a series of components: Significantly, NSIRA asserts that it needs to “independently test the completeness of information it receives” (13) and to accomplish this will be building out a “tailored access” process to verify information. NSIRA diplomatically notes that, “in a review relationship there will necessarily be healthy tensions stemming from differences in perspective” but it leads to a question of whether part of that tension is the extent to which NSIRA can access information. The first paragraph of this section even ends with, “NSIRA’s ability to fulfil its mandate can be challenged when it faces delays in receiving information” (13). Section 1.5 ‘Trust but verify,’ continues with a theme of the report: that NSIRA has had some challenges in accessing information from the organizations it is mandated to review. I am curious, however, how the Code will apply to individuals after their employment with NSIRA and how it extends beyond their professional requirements to continue managing the secrets with which they have been entrusted. Developing such Codes are routine for many organizations. The Code, “sets out the organizational values that guide the workforce’s activities and functions and the expected standards that must be observed during and after a person’s employment with the NSIRA Secretariat” (12). In section 1.4, ‘Values and goals,’ NSIRA notes that its Secretariat developed a Code of Conduct, which was completed in June 2021. While this isn’t a surprise given that NSIRA’s staff have had to work through the COVID-19 pandemic like everyone else, the result seems to have been significant delays in some reviews which are noted in subsequent sections of the report. What stood out in the overview of the report was that staff lacked regular and sustained access to offices wherein they could access classified materials. The headings used in this post, save for analysis headings, are correlated with the headings of the same name in the annual report itself. In this post, I proceed in the order of the annual review and highlight key items that stood out. However, while these tripwires are likely meant to demonstrate the robustness of NSIRA reviews they run the risk of undermining review conclusions if not carefully managed. It is imperative that observers pay close attention to these tripwires in future reviews. NSIRA has spent time in the annual report laying out tripwires that, if activated, will alert Canadians and their elected officials to problems that the review agency may be experiencing in fulfilling its mandate.While most of NSIRA’s reviews have been completed in spite of the pandemic, this is not the case with CSE reviews where several remain outstanding.It is not entirely clear why this has been the case. The exception to this, however, is that NSIRA has experienced challenges obtaining information from the Communications Security Establishment (CSE). NSIRA has generally been able to obtain the information it required to carry out its reviews.I want to highlight three points that emerge from my reading of report: NSIRA is responsible for conducting national security reviews of Canadian federal agencies, and their annual report summarizes activities that have been undertaken in 2020 and also indicates NSIRA’s plans for future work. On December 13, 2021, the National Security Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) released its 2020 Annual Report. ![]()
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